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“[T]he Constitution forbids ‘sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination.’”1
“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a
voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if
the right to vote is undermined.”2

INTRODUCTION
Private voter registration drives have been remarkably effective in
the last few presidential elections. In 2004, groups such as Rock the
Vote, Project Vote, and the League of Women Voters registered ten
million new voters through voter registration drives.3 In one particular
Florida county that demonstrates the scope of this broad effort, private
registration accounted for the majority of all new voter registrations.4
Recalling the narrow state margins of victory in 2000 helps to shed light
on the significance of such activities in the greater national registration
scheme.5 Even in the 2008 electoral landslide, a substantial number of
those electoral votes were cast on the basis of fewer than 20,000
individual votes.6 For this very reason, voter registration has proven a
fertile area for partisan maneuvering at the state level, and accordingly
has been the subject of a number of legal battles in federal court.7

1 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275
(1939)).
2 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
3 Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, Voting Law Changes in 2012, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE 20 (2012), http://brennan.3cdn.net/92635ddafbc09e8d88_i3m6bjdeh.pdf.
4 Id.
5 Presidential Election of 2000, Electoral and Popular Vote Summary, INFORMATION
PLEASE DATABASE (2007), http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0876793.html. Florida went to
George Bush by a margin of fewer than 1,000 votes; Iowa, by fewer than 5,000; New Hampshire
by roughly 7,000; New Mexico, by fewer than 500.
6 Public Disclosure Division, Office of Communications, Federal Election Commission,
2008
Official
Presidential General
Election
Results
2
(Jan.
22, 2009),
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/2008presgeresults.pdf. Missouri, Montana, and North Carolina
are examples.
7 See Wendy R. Weiser & Diana Kasdan, Voting Law Changes: Election Update, BRENNAN
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Those seeking to increase voter participation champion the
activities of third-party voter registration organizations (hereinafter
3PVROs) as demonstrations of civic virtue and preservative of the
democratic process.8 Others, concerned by perceived irregularities at the
voting booth, argue that local government should take a greater role in
regulating voter registration; their fear is that the process could be
abused for political ends.9 In response, numerous state legislatures have
recently debated or enacted restrictions on 3PVRO activity. 10 While
employing different tactics for regulating 3PVROs, these laws share
marked similarities: mandatory turnaround times for voter registration
applications, harsh criminal and civil sanctions for even minor or
accidental violations of election laws, training requirements for
3PVROs and their volunteers, and in some cases, strict reporting and
archiving responsibilities.11
Proponents argue that such restrictions are necessary to deter
potential fraud.12 Challengers have responded by claiming that voting
registration is intricately entwined with voting, and therefore protected
under classic constitutional doctrine surrounding the rights to free
speech and freedom of association.13 More recently, they have also
argued that the act of registering voters is itself expressive conduct and
political speech conveying the explicit or implicit political message that
a potential voter ought to engage civically through voting. 14 However,
federal courts have struggled to apply consistent standards in evaluating
the constitutionality of state election laws.15 This is particularly true
with regard to laws that regulate voter registration.16
This Note argues that 3PVRO activities implicate First
Amendment rights to a degree that merits substantial constitutional
protection, and therefore more robust judicial scrutiny of laws
regulating them. The applicable constitutional standard requires a court
CENTER
FOR
JUSTICE
7
(2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/publications/Voting_Law_Changes_Election_Update.pdf.
8 Weiser & Norden, supra note 3, at 20.
9 How Widespread is Voter Fraud? 2012 Facts & Figures, TRUE THE VOTE,
http://www.truethevote.org/news/how-widespread-is-voter-fraud-2012-facts-figures (last visited
Jan. 12, 2013); see also Weiser & Norden, Voting Law Changes in 2012, supra note 3, at 20.
10 Weiser & Norden, supra note 3, at 21.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 2.
13 See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb (LWV I), 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1334
(S.D. Fla. 2006).
14 See, e.g., Voting for Am., Inc. v. Andrade (Andrade I), 888 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Tex.
2012).
15 Compare Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (N.D. Ohio 2006), with Am.
Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera (Herrera I), 580 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1215–18 (D.N.M.
2008).
16 See supra note 15.
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to ask whether the regulated acts constitute political activity within the
meaning of the First Amendment. An approach that more accurately
reflects the political nature of voter registration will likewise enhance
the utility of that standard, and yield more consistent results. 17 This
Note further argues that in certain cases restrictions on voter registration
activities severely burden core First Amendment rights, and should
therefore be subject to the most rigorous scrutiny.18
In Part I, this Note presents the prevailing state of the law by
reviewing leading Supreme Court cases and detailing the inconsistent
application of that law at the trial and appellate levels. Part II analyzes
why this dominant case law has been applied incorrectly, and presents a
framework for incorporating additional relevant law into an analysis of
such regulations. In Part III, this Note proposes an additional framework
for especially severe restrictions, arguing that in such cases a balancing
test is inappropriate, and heightened standards of review should apply.
I. BACKGROUND
Regulation of voter registration inevitably affects the rights to vote
and associate with others for political purposes.19 Registration
conducted with the purpose of increasing political participation (the
only plausible motive for conducting voter registration drives) is an
unequivocal exercise of those rights.20 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit stated
explicitly that voter registration was speech protected by the First
Amendment.21 Yet cases interpreting restrictions on 3PVROs have
ranged broadly in interpreting the degree to which voter registration
activities implicate the First Amendment.22
Constitutionally, a voter registration drive can be analyzed two
ways: as an activity sufficiently intertwined with voting to merit
inclusion under the protection afforded voting in particular,23 and as
expressive conduct and speech that itself merits First Amendment
17 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793–94 (1983); see infra Part I to learn about this
test, as it constitutes the central point of controversy that this Note addresses.
18 This argument is buttressed by a substantial chain of Supreme Court decisions, including
but not limited to: Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182
(1999).
19 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
20 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214, 214 (1986).
21 Preminger v. Peake, 536 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (opinion amended and
superseded on other grounds).
22 Compare Herrera II, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1216, with Herrera I, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
23 See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera (Herrera II), 690 F. Supp. 2d
1183, 1212–13 (D.N.M. 2010).
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protections.24 Most recent federal decisions have traveled almost
exclusively down the first path in performing their constitutional
analyses.25 That path—which starts at the firmly protected right to vote,
and then tries to decide what is included in that right—has
overwhelmingly resulted in application of a balancing test.26 This test
represents a particularized form of intermediate scrutiny that in practice
has yielded wildly disparate results.27 Even when evaluating highly
similar laws, the courts demonstrate essentially no consensus about the
extent to which voter registration is intertwined with the right to vote—
and therefore, the extent to which it shares in the special constitutional
protections that voting receives.28
The difficulty is in applying the proper form of judicial review, one
that meaningfully accounts for the actual nature of the rights implicated,
the level to which those rights are burdened, and the state’s authority to
regulate them. In doing so, any court reviewing an election regulation
must first assure itself that the challenged law does in fact implicate
questions of a constitutional nature.29
When regulations heavily burden rights that are considered to be
fundamental to the constitutional scheme, the court employs a standard
called “strict” or “exacting” scrutiny.30 Strict scrutiny requires the court
to search the challenged law for a compelling government interest.31 If it
finds one, the court must then ask if the regulation employs the least
restrictive means possible in order to accomplish that purpose.32 The
goal of strict scrutiny is to erect a tall, protective barrier around essential
rights and liberties.33
24 See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning (LWV III), 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158–
59 (N.D. Fla. 2012); Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
25 See, e.g., Herrera II, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13. But see Project Vote, 455 F. Supp. 2d at
700 (“These rights belong to—and may be invoked by—not just the voters seeking to register, but
by third parties who encourage participation in the political process through increasing voter
registration rolls”). The other path, which interprets voter registration activities as expressive
conduct and speech protected under the First Amendment, is addressed in Part III.
26 See infra Part I.A.
27 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a
Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 657 (2008) (describing
the state of voting law as “thoroughly unsettled”).
28 See supra note 22.
29 This Note focuses on First Amendment arguments, though the same issue is regularly
interpreted through an Equal Protection lens as well. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006); Fla. State Conference of the NAACP
v. Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (N.D. Fla. 2008); ACORN v. Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119
(D. Conn. 2005). Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), one of this Note’s keystone cases,
invalidated the statute in question on not only First but also Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
30 See, e.g., Meyer, 486 U.S. 414.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. (“[T]he freedom of speech [is] . . . among the fundamental personal rights and liberties
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At the other end of the spectrum is “rational basis” review. Courts
apply this standard for challenges to laws that appear neutral with
regard to constitutional rights.34 In such cases, the court merely asks
whether the government had a legitimate purpose in enacting the
regulation, and whether the means employed are rationally related to
that purpose.35 The goal, generally, is to permit legal challenges while
still granting broad leeway to the legislature to enact laws within the
proper scope of its authority.36
These standards entail such different inquiries that a choice in one
direction or another may dictate the outcome of the case itself. 37 It is
therefore essential to develop a viable framework for determining which
is the appropriate standard, and why.
Some courts reason that First Amendment rights are scarcely
implicated in voter registration activities,38 whereas others hold that
such rights are deeply implicated.39 Since the result of this analysis is
largely dispositive under the current framework, the lion’s share of
judicial interpretation centers on illuminating the constitutional
implications of engaging in private voter registration drives.40
A. Federal Courts Apply a Balancing Test When Evaluating the
Constitutionality of State Election Laws
Despite the broad doctrinal differences courts reveal in their
interpretation of voting laws, they uniformly41 apply a balancing test
which are secured to all persons . . . against abridgment by a State”) (citing to Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940)).
34 See, e.g., Voting for America, Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2013).
35 Id.
36 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 799 (2006).
37 Id. at 798-99.
38 See, e.g., Herrera I, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1213; League of Women Voters of Fla. v.
Browning (LWV II), 575 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1320–21 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
39 See LWV III, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1158–59 (“The assertion that the challenged provisions
implicate no constitutional rights is plainly wrong.”); Herrera II, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (“[T]he
Court finds that the Plaintiffs . . . have met both prongs of the expressive-conduct standard and
have, accordingly, stated a First–Amendment expressive-conduct claim.”); LWV I, 447 F. Supp.
2d at 1331–32 (“[T]he collection and submission of voter registration drives is intertwined with
speech and association . . .”); Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ohio 2006)
(“[P]articipation in voter registration implicates a number of both expressive and associational
rights which are protected by the First Amendment.”).
40 See infra Part II (answering one question provides the answer to the second as well).
41 With one very recent exception: Voting for America, Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382 (5th Cir.
2013), falls far outside the mainstream in applying rational basis. Even so, the court still conducts
a lengthy Anderson/Burdick analysis in its opinion. Id. at 386–89. To demonstrate exactly how far
outside the mainstream Steen is, recall that it applied rational basis to a residency requirement for
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derived from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Anderson v. Celebrezze42
and Burdick v. Takushi43 in conducting constitutional review of state
election laws. Neither case addressed voter registration. However,
sweeping language in the opinions seems to permit application of these
cases’ reasoning to other situations in the electoral context.44
This inquiry into the constitutionality of a state election law that
burdens the right to vote has two stages. First, the court will interpret
the extent to which a set of regulations implicates First Amendment
rights.45 If the burden on those rights is especially severe, it may apply
strict scrutiny.46 If the burden is less significant, or only indirectly
implicates those rights, the court will apply the balancing test first
articulated in Anderson.47 The Anderson test requires the court to
consider first the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
challenger’s rights, and then to identify and evaluate the State’s
justification for imposing that injury. 48 The legitimacy and strength of
these interests are then balanced against the burden imposed.49 This is
widely known as “intermediate scrutiny.”50
In Anderson, the Court invalidated an Ohio statute requiring
independent candidates for office to complete filings by an earlier date
than candidates from the two mainstream parties.51 The Court reasoned
that this deadline required independent voters and candidates to solidify
their strategies substantially earlier than those supporting or
representing mainstream parties.52 In the context of an operation as

voter registration volunteers. Id. at 392–93. In cases deciding the constitutionality of residency
requirements for petition circulators—a role this Note argues is functionally indistinguishable—
four out of five Courts of Appeal have applied strict scrutiny. Indeed, federal appellate courts are
in “general agreement that [such] . . . restrictions burden First Amendment rights in a sufficiently
severe fashion to merit the closest examination.” Libertarian Party of Va. V. Judd, 718 F.3d 308,
318 (4th Cir. 2013).
42 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
43 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
44 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788–89. (“Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the
registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting
process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his
right to associate with others for political ends. Nevertheless, the state’s important regulatory
interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.
Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws therefore cannot be
resolved by any ‘litmus-paper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.”).
45 Id. at 789.
46 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
47 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783.
51 Id. at 782–83.
52 Id. at 792–93.
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highly tactical and sensitive as a national election, this imposed a real
burden on voters sympathetic to independent candidates or parties.53
Further, the Court was unimpressed by Ohio’s claimed justifications
that the law would provide greater opportunity to educate voters, and
that it preserved a higher degree of political stability. 54 The interests of
the voter, the Court noted, were its primary concern; any burdens falling
on political candidates were presumed also to fall, at least theoretically,
on the rights of voters as well.55 Holding that there was no “litmuspaper test” for evaluation of state election laws, the Anderson Court
weighed the law’s admittedly tenuous burden on the right to vote
against the state’s claimed interests.56
Anderson states that voter registration “inevitably affects—at least
to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate
with others for political ends,”57 but it goes no further in defining how,
or how much. The use of this balancing test was reaffirmed in Burdick
v. Takushi.58 There, a Hawaiian election regulation prohibiting write-in
voting was challenged on the ground that it impaired voters’
constitutional rights.59 The Burdick Court applied the Anderson
balancing approach despite the complainant’s request that the Court
apply a strict standard of review.60 The Court cited Anderson frequently,
reasoning that, while any election regulation will inevitably affect
voting rights, to subject all such regulations to strict scrutiny would
unreasonably tie the hands of local and state government to administer
elections.61 The Court held that Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting
only affected the rights of voters who had been unable to get their
candidates on the ballot through the ordinary petition process (which
was equally available to all candidates).62 Applying the Anderson
balancing test, the Court found this burden too limited to merit the
heavy scrutiny the challengers sought, given the alternate and equally
viable methods of ballot access still permitted under state law.63

53
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id. at 796–805.
Id. at 786.
Bhagwat, supra note 50 at 789.
Id. at 788 (“Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself,
inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to
associate with others for political ends.”).
58 504 U.S. 428.
59 Id. at 430.
60 Id. at 433–34.
61 Id. See also id. at 438 (“The appropriate standard for evaluating a claim that a state law
burdens the right to vote is set forth in Anderson.”).
62 Id. at 436–37.
63 Id. at 438–39.
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Broad language in these opinions about the effects of state election
regulations has permitted Anderson’s influence to expand outward from
ballot-access restriction, to cases involving meaningfully different
laws.64 Burdick presumed that it was the standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of all state election laws. 65 While recent cases have
uniformly applied the Anderson test to cases involving 3PVROs, and
thus presumably imported its reasoning, those courts have differed
drastically in their treatment of voter registration’s First Amendment
implications—an essential ingredient of the Anderson test.66 Some
courts reason that First Amendment rights are scarcely implicated in
voter registration activities, and therefore laws purporting to regulate
them deserve more deferential scrutiny from the judiciary. 67 Others hold
that such rights are deeply implicated, and that such laws risk burdening
the exercise of fundamental rights.68 Yet even courts that view the
connection between voter registration and First Amendment voting
rights as too attenuated to merit robust scrutiny69 apply the Anderson
test.70
Confusion (and thus inconsistency) appear to result from the
redundancy of the Anderson test’s two prongs.71 They seem different,
but the difference as applied is merely semantic—in fact, they are
unable to operate independently of one another.72 This has a paradoxical
result: answering the first question provides the answer to the second as
well. A judge who isn’t convinced that voter registration is within the
constellation of First Amendment rights would be hard-pressed to view
burdens on those activities as severe enough to merit real scrutiny.
Alternatively, a judge of the opinion that voter registration is an
important part of that body of rights could only be skeptical of
bureaucratic procedures that hinder their exercise. Troublingly, though
perhaps not surprisingly, the results follow decisively partisan lines.73
64
65

See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
That is to say, all state election laws that do not facially discriminate. Burdick, 504 U.S. at

438.
66
67
68
69

See supra note 22.
Herrera I, 580 F.Supp.2d 1195.
Herrera II, 690 F.Supp.2d 1183.
Or that such regulations constitute “reasonable, non-discriminatory” regulations requiring
only rational basis review. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[T]here must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”).
70 Herrera I, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1195.
71 Once again: The first prong consists of evaluating the burden on the complainant’s rights.
The second consists of counterbalancing the government’s justification for imposing that burden.
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
72 See supra notes 38–39 for cases in which the answer to the first prong supplies an answer
to the second.
73 Republican judges overwhelmingly view voter registration as an incidental aspect of voting
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Such broad discrepancies indicate that the discourse is not entirely
rooted in a meaningful analysis of the actual burdens each law poses to
constitutional rights.74 Given the dangerous malleability of this
balancing test, it is well worth investigating the national context of
constitutional challenges to voter registration laws in light of recent
federal—and particularly Supreme Court—decisions. As Professor
Elmendorf notes: “A doctrine that makes scrutiny levels highly
dependent on the judge’s own normative intuitions seems . . . ill advised
for an election law domain in which jurisprudential intuitions and
partisan interests coincide.”75 Despite these difficulties, however, the
majority of federal decisions reveal something resembling a consensus.
That view—and the view expressed in this Note—is that registering
voters is sufficiently entwined with voting to merit substantial First
Amendment protection.76
B. Federal Courts Applying the Anderson Balancing Test Have Ruled
Inconsistently on State Voter Registration Laws
As noted in the introduction, the actual mechanisms by which State
election laws regulate 3PVROs vary. More exhaustive materials can be
found elsewhere,77 but a brief look into provisions of some of the
challenged laws will help the reader to understand the legal arguments
at play. Most important is to note how the laws themselves, while
occasionally containing unique provisions, are fundamentally
interchangeable—they use different means to accomplish the same
result.78 Doing so will highlight the stark dissimilarities in the respective
courts’ reasoning and results.
The Florida statute challenged in League of Women Voters III79
required 3PVROs to submit completed applications within 48 hours of
rights, or a purely administrative task that involves few if any constitutional questions.
Democratic judges view private voter registration drives as civic and political activity inherently
protected by the Constitution and federal statute. Elmendorf, supra note 27, at 704.
74 See Herrera I, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D.N.M. 2008). Cf. Herrera II, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183
(D.N.M. 2010).
75 Elmendorf, supra note 27, at 667.
76 Consensus is determined by a number of decisions. See supra note 39.
77 See generally Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008, UNITED STATES
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/
publications/p20/2008/tables.html (last visited March 2, 2014); Voter Registration
Modernization,
LAWYERS’
COMMITTEE
FOR
CIVIL
RIGHTS
UNDER
LAW,
http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/issues?id=0005 (last visited March 2, 2014); Weiser &
Kasdan, supra note 7.
78 The result is the sharp reduction, or even cessation, of 3PVRO activities. See Weiser &
Kasdan, supra note 7, at 3.
79 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
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completion, or face substantial penalties; to report the identities not only
of officers of the 3PVRO, but also any volunteer aiding the 3PVRO, as
well as the dates of their volunteering; to require each volunteer to sign
sworn statements that warned of strict felony liability for submitting
applications with false or incorrect information on them; and to
numerically account for every form it received and submitted to the
Board of Elections.80
The Ohio statute challenged in Project Vote v. Blackwell81 required
that those compensated by 3PVROs for their work pre-register with
local election officials; complete an online training; sign an affirmation
making reference to potential criminal liability; personally deliver or
mail each application collected; and identify themselves by name,
address, and 3PVRO affiliation.82
The Texas statute challenged in Voting for America, Inc. v.
Andrade imposed a scheme whereby only individuals registered to vote
in Texas could aid others in registering; limited workers to aiding only
those from the same county as themselves; required 3PVRO workers to
submit all completed applications in person; criminalized compensation
of 3PVRO workers; required training for all potential workers; and
required workers to carry documents containing their names and home
addresses, to be presented to any applicant that so requested.83
The New Mexico statute challenged in Herrera II required 3PVRO
workers to provide their names and addresses; to sign sworn statements
informing them of criminal and civil penalties for any failure to comply
with third-party registration laws; to submit completed application
forms within 48 hours; and made 3PVRO’s vicariously liable for the
acts of volunteers.84
Each of the courts reviewing these restrictions applied the
Anderson test, but rationales for doing so varied widely, if any was
presented at all. The court in Project Vote reasoned that, despite placing
burdens on “critical First Amendment rights,” those burdens were “not
likely properly characterized as ‘severe.’”85 The court in League of
Women Voters I reasoned that the case in question was analogous to a
Supreme Court case applying strict scrutiny, yet without explanation
elected to apply a balancing test.86 The court in Herrera II, in a detailed
exegesis of the pertinent law at that time, factually distinguished the
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.0575 (West 2011).
455 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.29 (LexisNexis 2008).
See Andrade, 888 F. Supp. 2d 816.
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-49 (West 2007).
Project Vote v Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
LWV I, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1331–32 (S.D. Fla. 2006). That Supreme Court case is
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), discussed at length in Part III.
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requirements in question from those in cases mandating strict scrutiny; 87
any discussion of the inevitable and discriminatory effects of regulating
3PVROs out of existence, though, is notably absent. 88 Most curiously,
the court in Andrade I applied Anderson’s balancing test even though it
considered several of the challenged regulations arguably subject to
strict scrutiny. The court justified this by stating that the provisions
would not survive either form of scrutiny.89
Both Herrera I90 and League of Women Voters II91 were skeptical
of the degree to which voter registration drives implicated rights of
speech and association.92 For example, the court in Herrera I claimed
that, because the law did not purport to regulate either the literal content
of speech or the legal right to conduct voter registration drives, any
expressive aspect of such activity was merely “incidental,” and was
itself unregulated by the challenged law.93 Similarly, League of Women
Voters II found that the collection of voter registration forms was not
inherently expressive activity.94 These courts reasoned that only a
content-based restriction, or one that imposed a “severe” burden, would
merit invalidation on constitutional grounds.95
In stark contrast, five federal district courts (including subsequent
rehearings in both the New Mexico and Florida cases) have held that
voter registration activities do implicate substantial First Amendment
concerns.96 The court in Herrera II97 based this ruling on several
grounds. First, it cited a Supreme Court decision holding that any
conduct intended to convey a message—if accompanied by a likelihood
that those viewing the conduct will understand this message—may
constitute “expressive conduct.”98 The 3PVROs had argued that their
actions were intended to convey the message that “voting is important,
that [they] believe in civic participation, and that [they] are willing to
expend the resources to broaden the electorate to include allegedly
under-served communities.”99 Crucially, the court cited the proposition
87
88
89
90
91
92

Herrera II, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1212–14 (D.N.M. 2010).
Id.
Voting for America, Inc. v. Andrade, 888 F. Supp. 2d 816, 843 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
580 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.M. 2008).
575 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
It is meaningful that, despite their skepticism, both courts felt compelled to apply the
Anderson test, which measures the burden on constitutional rights. Herrera I, 580 F. Supp. 2d at
1229–30; LWV II, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
93 Herrera I, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
94 LWV II, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
95 Herrera I, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1213–14; LWV II, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1320.
96 LWV III, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Herrera II, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183; LWV I,
447 F. Supp. 2d 1314; Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
97 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D.N.M. 2010).
98 Id. at 1200 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
99 Id. at 1216–16.
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that not registering to vote may be a political choice.100 The 3PVRO’s
activities advocated a particular response to that choice, and therefore
were construed as political expression as well.101
Second, the Herrera II court found that incidental speech between
registration applicants and those registering was protected by the First
Amendment, since the act of registering and the incidental speech were
“inherently intertwined.”102 The court replied to claims that the law only
indirectly burdened such speech by citing Supreme Court doctrine
refuting the permissibility of that notion.103 The court interpreted a
burden falling indirectly on protected speech as being therefore worthy
of scrutiny, regardless of the law’s putative indifference to that speech.
Lastly, the same court found that voter registration implicates the right
of “expressive association,” since that right includes not just the right to
associate with others, but also the right to select the optimal means for
doing so.104
This reasoning can be found in League of Women Voters I as
well.105 In that case, the court found that restrictions on voter
registration drives presented a diminution of actual political speech.106
The state had claimed that a purportedly content-neutral statute such as
this left open other modes of speaking. In response, the court reasoned
that a law leaving open only “‘more burdensome’ avenues of
communication” was not constitutionally sound. 107 Further, in response
to the State’s allegations that voter registration was merely inexpressive
conduct, the court held that voter registration activities are “intertwined
with speech and association.”108
In Project Vote v. Blackwell, a district court in Ohio accepted
without analysis the proposition that voter registration drives implicate

100 Id. at 1216 (citing Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 195–97
(1999)).
101 Id. (“Rather than lacking communicative force, efforts to register people to vote
communicates a message that democratic participation is important . . . [T]o participate in voter
registration is to take a position and express a point of view in the ongoing debate whether to
engage or to disengage from the political process.”).
102 Id. at 1217; see also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 444 U.S. 620
(1980).
103 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988) (“That appellees remain free to employ other
means to disseminate their ideas does not take their speech . . . outside the bounds of First
Amendment protection.”).
104 Herrera II, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653
(2000) (“As we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its
expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its
expression.”).
105 LWV I, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
106 Id. at 1332–33.
107 Id. at 1334.
108 LWV I, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
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First Amendment expressive and associational rights. 109 Further, it
found that these rights may be invoked by third party participants, such
as 3PVROs.110 However, in electing to apply intermediate scrutiny and
not strict scrutiny, the court reasoned it was unlikely that the challenged
law’s burdens on speech could be properly characterized as “severe.”111
That court neglected, unfortunately, to describe its (or any) standard for
determining what would constitute a “severe” burden.
In League of Women Voters III,112 the court forcefully rejected the
State’s assertions that voter registration did not implicate First
Amendment rights, calling such assertions “plainly wrong.” 113 Some of
the challenged law’s provisions, such as requiring certain registration
workers to disclose their identities, regulated “pure speech,” and “core
First Amendment activity.”114
The laws described, while not identical, employ a few central
types of provisions used to regulate private registration drives. As
mentioned above, these include registration of 3PVRO workers,
mandated training and reporting procedures, and heightened sanctions
for violations of registration procedure.115 However, the aggregate
results reveal how inconsistently such laws are interpreted under the
Anderson balancing test.
PART II. THE SUPREME COURT’S BALANCING TEST HAS BEEN APPLIED
INCORRECTLY BY FEDERAL COURTS INTERPRETING STATE LAW BURDENS
ON PRIVATE VOTER REGISTRATION ACTIVITIES
While the Anderson line of cases presents a commonly accepted
way of interpreting these laws, that line is neither the most well-adapted
to understanding the relevant laws, nor does it most incisively articulate
the rights in danger. As noted by the Sixth Circuit, applying a test to
voter registration that is meant for evaluating burdens on access to the
ballot “misses the point;”116 while Anderson and Burdick pertain to the
range of choices available to the voter, burdens on voter registration
directly burden the right of the citizen to actually have his or her vote
109
110

455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
Id. at 701 (“[P]articipation in voter registration implicates a number of both expressive and
associational rights which are protected by the First Amendment. These rights belong to—and
may be invoked by—not just the voters seeking to register, but by third parties who encourage
participation in the political process through increasing voter registration rolls.”).
111 Id.
112 LWV III, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See supra Part I.B.
116 Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 861 (6th Cir. 2006).
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counted.117 The difference is not inconsequential. The right to vote
obviously doesn’t consist of a right to choose only from among
candidates that the voter views favorably—selecting the lesser of two
evils is the paradigmatic example. However, the right to voice a
preference at all is much more fundamental.118
That said, the transition away from the Anderson test is likely to
occur only as the federal judiciary develops a jurisprudence aimed more
specifically at voter registration. Further, since the various voter
registration laws employ different procedures, they create different
burdens; the process of weighing the severity of those burdens on the
right to vote is not likely to disappear anytime soon.
Challenges to 3PVRO laws have so far generated inconsistent
results because federal courts disagree about the extent to which voter
registration implicates First Amendment Rights. 119 The first component
of the Anderson balancing test requires courts to evaluate how
burdensome the challenged law is to the complainant’s constitutional
rights.120 Because the currently controlling precedent does not actually
discuss voter registration,121 trial courts are essentially left alone to
determine the nature of the rights implicated, and thus the weight of the
burden.122 In some cases, federal judges have disposed of this inquiry
almost casually.123 Not a single case discussed has pursued an empirical
evaluation of 3PVRO activity within the broader context of state and
federal election regimes. In contrast, Anderson was explicit that an
election law’s impact must be examined in a realistic light.124
Misapplication of Supreme Court standards reached its nadir in
Voting for America, Inc. v. Steen, wherein the Fifth Circuit became the
first federal court to hold the Anderson/Burdick balancing test
inapplicable to a constitutional challenge to state election law. 125 The
state law in that instance prohibited (among other things) non-Texans
from collecting or submitting voter registration applications,126 and
117
118

Id.
See Brief of Erwin Chemerinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Crawford
v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2007 WL 3407037.
119 See supra Part I.
120 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
121 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992) (prohibition of write-in voting did not
impermissibly burden the right to vote); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782–86 (early filing deadline
placed unconstitutional restriction on voting and associational rights).
122 See Part I.
123 See Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (burden
imposed by voter registration law “not likely properly characterized as ‘severe.’”).
124 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786. As described infra, the Second Circuit clarified this directive to
require evaluation of the law’s burden “within the context of state’s overall scheme of election
regulations.” Lerman v. Bd. of Elections in City of New York, 232 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2000).
125 Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2013).
126 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 13.031(d)(3) (West 2013).
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anyone from collecting or delivering applications in any county where
they had not been officially deputized by the local Board of Elections.127
In Steen, the court opined that voter registration is actually a
“smorgasbord of activities” that must be disassembled into its
constituent sub-activities for judicial review.128 The court then claimed
that the collection and submission of registration applications had no
constitutional protection at all, and that these activities therefore merited
only rational basis review.129
The reasoning of this decision will be discussed at greater length
in Part III, but suffice it for now to say that the theory applied in Steen
flatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent regarding analysis of such
challenges, and is clearly erroneous. As Burdick notes, “[t]he
appropriate standard for evaluating a claim that a state law burdens the
right to vote is set forth in Anderson.”130 In turn, Anderson holds that
“[c]onstitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election
laws” must be addressed through the balancing test it then articulates.131
Indeed, Anderson held that “[e]ach provision of [state election law,]
whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself,
inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to
vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.” 132 The
Court’s repeated findings that the Anderson test—at minimum—applies
in constitutional challenges to state election law cannot be squared with
the Steen court’s reasoning otherwise.
A. State Laws That Aggressively Hinder Private Voter Registration
Drives Place Substantial Burdens on the Right to Vote
In Burdick, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that all voting
regulations be subject to strict scrutiny, holding that to do so “would tie
the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated
equitably and efficiently.”133 When state election law subjects
constitutional rights to a severe burden, they must be narrowly drawn,
and aimed at particularly weighty government interests.134 A lesser
burden, though, must only be countered with state interests of sufficient
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. § 13.038.
Steen, 732 F.3d at 388.
Id. at 392.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992).
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992).
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relevance and legitimacy.135 Indeed, under Burdick, “the state’s
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”136 Importantly, while
3PVROs challenging such laws must present evidence of a burden, it
does not appear that an empirical record of any kind is required by the
courts in order to find that prevention of voter fraud is a legitimate state
interest.137
But what is “reasonable” and “non-discriminatory” in this context?
Is a regulation that results in unequal access to the voting process
“discriminatory,” or must such a regulation actively discriminate on its
face? Furthermore, what is “severe?” Given the plain text of the Voting
Rights Act and the National Voter Registration Act, it would appear that
statutes resulting in unequal opportunity to exercise the franchise are
themselves per se unreasonable and discriminatory.138 Anderson itself
articulated the inquiry required in evaluating these criteria as “whether
the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the
availability of political opportunity.” 139 Accordingly, any statute that
entails such a result places a substantial burden on those statutorily and
constitutionally protected rights.
There are a number of empirical factors worth discussing in the
context of performing an Anderson balancing test. First, voter
registration drives contribute to the national goal of increasing voter
registration, a goal that is explicitly codified in the National Voter
Registration Act.140 Second, they do so almost entirely through the
means suggested in the Act.141 Third, claims that registration drives
result in in-person voter fraud142—the primary rationale offered as
justification for these regulations—are close to being factually baseless.
Recognition of these factors must be part of any impartial legal
analysis,143 regardless of the evidentiary standard required of states
135 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (quoting Norman, 502
U.S. at 288–89).
136 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
137 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194–96 (reasoning that such fraud is a legitimate interest despite
also finding “no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its
history.”); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997).
138 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012) (“A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens . . . ”).
139 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 (quoting Clements v. Flushing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982)).
140 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
141 Id. § 1973gg-4(b) (“The . . . State shall make the forms described . . . available for
distribution through governmental and private entities, with particular emphasis on making them
available for organized voter registration programs.”).
142 See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181; see also Weiser & Norden, supra note 3.
143 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (“That the Government’s
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defending such laws,144 but especially in jurisdictions where courts
apply a balancing test. Fourth, because of the exceptional prominence of
voter registration drives as a means of registering voters in lowerincome or minority communities, severe burdens on those drives will
have a discriminatory impact on vulnerable members of the votingeligible population.145 As a result, laws that “freeze out” 3PVRO
activity will severely and unequally burden the exercise of the right to
vote itself.146
The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)147 was enacted in
response to Congressional findings that the right to vote was
“fundamental,” that it was the duty of Federal, State, and local
governments to promote voting, and that “discriminatory and unfair”
regulations can have both direct impact on voter participation and
disproportionate effects on subgroups, including racial minorities.148
While the stated Congressional purpose of protecting the “integrity” of
elections149 is heavily emphasized by those backing restrictions on
registration drives, the preceding enumerated purposes—to create
systems that increase the number of registered voters,150 and to aid
government at all levels in enhancing participation in elections151—are
asserted interests are important in the abstract does not mean, however, that the must-carry rules
will in fact advance those interests.”); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (“[I]f there
are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally
protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference.”); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) (“[T]he constitution forbids ‘sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes
of discrimination.’”); Crawford, 553 U.S. at 188–9 (holding only that the established factual
record was insufficient to sustain a facial challenge).
144 Cf. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196–97; Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups 554 F.3d 1340,
1353 (11th Cir. 2009).
145 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008—Detailed Tables at Table 14:
Method of Registration by Selected Characteristics: November 2008, UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.html
(last visited March 2, 2014); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (requiring that
courts “examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of [the law’s] impact on voters” when
weighing certain types of election regulations).
146 Press Release, League of Women Voters of Collier Cnty., League of Women Voters
Announcement Regarding Cessation of Voter Registration in the State of Florida (May 7, 2011),
available
at
http://www.lwvcolliercounty.org/pdfs/cessation.pdf;
Voter
Registration
Modernization,
LAWYERS’
COMMITTEE
FOR
CIVIL
RIGHTS
UNDER
LAW,
http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/issues?id=0005 (last visited March 2, 2014); Weiser &
Norden, supra note 3, at 28–30. See Brief of Erwin Chemerinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-25),
2007 WL 3407037; see also Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 861 (6th Cir. 2006)
(distinguishing Burdick, where the law’s burden fell on a candidate’s access to the ballot, and not
a voter’s right to vote).
147 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2011).
148 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(a) (2011).
149 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)(3) (2011).
150 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)(1) (2011).
151 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)(2) (2011).
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too frequently ignored.
Thus, Congress’s purpose in enacting this law was not merely to
make voter registration more accurate, but to enlarge its scope entirely,
particularly in the face of voter registration procedures that result in
unequal access for subgroups such as racial minorities.152 To the extent
that they provide the service of registering eligible citizens, private
registration organizations function as envisioned by federal law. Given
the substantial responsibility that such organizations have assumed for
registering voters in the absence of equivalent efforts by state and local
agencies,153 they occupy an essential place in the federal election
regulation scheme. State election regulations that burden these
organizations therefore burden the functioning of the federal election
scheme.
Furthermore, the application of any nomination or election
standard that results in unequal opportunity to participate in elections is
at least nominally in violation of the Voting Rights Act.154 The language
of these provisions is plainly oriented toward not just facially
discriminatory election regulations, but those that create obstacles to
equal voter participation in any form. The venerable Voting Rights Act
itself prescribes a “totality of the circumstances” test by which to
evaluate whether an election regulation may lead to unequal opportunity
to participate.155 This results-based prescription indicates that even
facially non-discriminatory regulations should be scrutinized carefully
for discriminatory effects.156
More specifically, the NVRA indicated the role that private voter
registration drives were to play in this effort. It requires State election
officials to make voter registration forms available to “private entities,”
with “particular emphasis” on organized voter registration drives.157
These activities were envisioned as sufficiently central to the Federal
voter registration scheme to merit named inclusion in the statute’s
protection.158 Furthermore, in Charles H. Wesley Educ. Foundation, Inc.
v. Cox, the Eleventh Circuit found that the NVRA specifically
encourages private registration drives.159 That ruling affirmed that
3PVROs have a federally-protected right to conduct voter registration
drives.160 State and local legislatures enacting restrictive election
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2011).
See infra note 169.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2011).
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-4(b) (2011).
Id.
Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1353–54.
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regulations for voter registration drives therefore run the risk of
undermining the stated Congressional purposes behind a federal
statutory regime.161 Even when states adopt measures that
unintentionally prevent a 3PVRO from conducting registration drives,
they may be violating federal law.162
The need for such registration drives is starkly apparent. Racial
minorities, young people, the poor, and the less-educated are all
registered to vote in abysmal amounts, ranging from roughly 50–60
percent.163 The number of unregistered but eligible voters represents
approximately one-quarter to one-third of all Americans.164 In 2008,
overall voter turnout for the Presidential election was just 64%—in
contrast to 90 percent among those registered, demonstrating the degree
to which registration is a fundamental precondition for enhancing voter
participation.165
In this context, the value of private voter registration drives is just
as obvious. Private registration drives have registered millions of voters
for the last several Presidential elections,166 and underrepresented
groups have registered through these drives at substantially higher rates,
in some cases double that of other groups.167 In one notable instance in
Florida, more than 60 percent of new voter registrations came through
private registration drives.168
In contrast, registration at public agencies has plummeted, and in
some cases nearly disappeared: between 1995 and 2010, at least four
states reported public agency registration decreases of more than 80
percent.169 Likewise, public agency registrations—the kind mandated by

161
162
163

Id.
LWV III, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1163 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
Voter Registration Modernization, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER
LAW, http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/issues?id=0005 (last visited March 2, 2014).
164 Id. See also Diana Kasdan, State Restrictions on Voter Registration Drives, BRENNAN
CENTER
FOR
JUSTICE
2
(Nov.
30,
2012),
http://brennan.3cdn.net/2665c26afbdd9a4bce_inm6blqw1.pdf.
165 Brenda Wright, Why Are 51 Million Eligible Americans Not Registered to Vote?, DEMOS
(Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.demos.org/publication/why-are-51-million-eligible-americans-notregistered-vote (last visited March 2, 2014).
166 Weiser & Norden, supra note 3, at 20.
167 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008—Detailed Tables at Table 14:
Method of Registration by Selected Characteristics: November 2008, UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.html
(last visited March 2, 2014); 2010 Issues on Election Administration: Restricting Voter
Registration
Drives,
PROJECT
VOTE
(July
2010),
http://projectvote.org/images/publications/2010%20Issues%20in%20Election%20Administration/
RestrictingVoterRegistrationDrives-July2010.pdf.
168 Weiser & Norden, supra note 3.
169 Ryan P. Haygood, The Past As Prologue: Defending Democracy Against Voter
Suppression Tactics on the Eve of the 2012 Elections, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1034 (2012).
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the NVRA—diminished 79 percent over that same time period.170
Indeed, a majority of states have recently reported declines in numbers
of registered voters.171 Between 2004 and 2006, the sum total of
registered voters in America declined overall.172 These failures have led
to a spate of legal challenges alleging failure by the States to uphold
their obligations under the NVRA,173 and if anything emphasize how
critical private registration drives have become to upholding the federal
mandate to increase voter registration rates.
Given the value of private registration drives in serving the stated
goals of Congress as codified in the NVRA—and the protection that
statute provides for them—it would appear State laws even minimally
burdening 3PVROs are in danger of acting contrary to federal law.
However, such burdens have been far more than minimal: the welldocumented history surrounding the enactment of Florida’s restrictions
on 3PVROs reveals that the proposed restrictions burdened a group of
3PVROs so severely that they decided to cancel all voter registration
efforts when the law was implemented.174 While their efforts were
restrained, voter registration in Florida dipped 100,000 votes over the
equivalent period of the prior election cycle—a difference of 14
percent.175 After the law was enjoined in League of Women Voters I,176
voter registration jumped back up again, registering record numbers of
new voters.177 State laws that “freeze out” private organizations
performing exactly the public function that was envisioned in the
federal election scheme, and that do so amid what can only be described
as a failing state registration apparatus, place severe burdens on the
eligible population’s right to vote.
B. The Court in League of Women Voters III Correctly Applied the
Anderson Framework to a State Law Restricting 3PVROs
As noted in Part I, several federal decisions have misread both the
170 Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
453, 474–75 (2008).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See id. at 476.
174 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, LWV I, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla.
2006) (No. 06CV21265), 2006 WL 1861182 (May 18, 2006); Press Release, League of Women
Voters of Collier Cnty., League of Women Voters Announcement Regarding Cessation of Voter
Registration
in
the
State
of
Florida
(May
7,
2011),
available
at
http://www.lwvcolliercounty.org/pdfs/cessation.pdf.
175 Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 7, at n.117.
176 League of Women Voters I, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314.
177 Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 7, at n.83-84.
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appropriate legal doctrine and the federal election context in seeking to
understand how voter registration implicates First Amendment rights.178
As a result, the case law appears haphazard and unreliable. By this point
it should be clear to the reader that much of that unreliability stems from
decisions that do not sufficiently inquire into the constitutional
implications of voter registration drives.179 Since it is true that lesser
restrictions may indeed not be properly characterized as severe, the
Anderson test is likely to remain the applicable standard for such
cases.180 Having provided some opportunities for examining those
implications, it is worth briefly examining a decision that correctly
applies the Anderson framework.
League of Women Voters III enjoined a state election law requiring
3PVROs to register with the state; identify their employees and officers;
file quarterly reports on their activities; return applications with 48
hours (or face steep fines); and sign affirmations containing language
incorrectly stating that registration workers who submitted applications
containing errors would be subject to felony liability. 181
In interrogating these provisions, the court noted that state law
already existed to regulate 3PVROs, and that no evidence had been
presented to suggest that further restrictions were compelled by
circumstance.182 It held that the 3PVROs were engaged in core First
Amendment activity, given their wish to speak and encourage others to
register to vote.183 It also held that, because they wished to do so
collectively, the right of association was implicated as well. That this
activity took place with the intent of aiding others in voting—an activity
of “special significance”—brought the entire activity within the realm
of constitutional protection.184
At this point, the League of Women Voters III court already
evinced a more thorough understanding of the constitutional rights
implicated by voter registration. With that understanding as a
foundation for its analysis, the court conducted a meaningful balancing
test that inquired whether the challenged provisions were sufficiently
tailored and grounded in a legitimate purpose.185 For example, the 48hour requirement was struck down. The court ruled that because of
strict penalties for failure to comply, and the absence of any legitimate
reason for choosing such a short timeframe, that requirement could
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
LWV III, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1158–59.
Id.
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serve no other purpose than to discourage voter registration.186
Similarly, the court struck down the requirement that volunteer 3PVRO
workers register with the state, on the grounds that the state had no real
interest in knowing their identities.187 In contrast, it was
disproportionately burdensome for the 3PVROs to comply, and
dangerous for the volunteer, whose reward for his or her civic sense of
duty could be up to five years in jail for failing to notice an error in
someone’s application—even where they had no means to ascertain that
error.188 Again, the court held that such a provision had no plausible
purpose other than the suppression of constitutionally protected
activity.189
The law is clear that voter registration implicates constitutional
rights.190 Burdens on constitutional rights, even those that are not
severe, require adequate tailoring and legitimate purposes. 191 This court
succeeded in envisioning the actual results of the challenged law, both
in terms of its burden on an essential civic function and coordinate
constitutional rights, and in terms of its alleged governmental purpose.
PART III. STATE LAWS THAT PUT SEVERE BURDENS ON THE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION OF THIRD-PARTY VOTER REGISTRATIONS MAY BE SUBJECT
TO STRICT SCRUTINY
There are at least two reasons a court evaluating the
constitutionality of a state voter registration law might apply strict
scrutiny. The first is by interpreting a direct burden on voter registration
as an indirect burden on the right to vote itself.192 The second is through
a rearticulation of the nature of registration activities—as acts of speech
and association themselves.
The right to vote is uncontroversially acknowledged to be profound
and essential (“preservative of all other rights”), and deserving of
substantial protection.193 However, that right is not “absolute,” and
elections must be fairly regulated.194 The closer an activity is to the
actual act of voting or expressing a political preference, the more
protection it deserves. For example, practices that “only potentially
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

LWV III, 863 F. Supp. at 1160–61.
Id.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
See supra Part I.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
See supra Part I.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.
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threaten political association are highly suspect.”195 The first path to
strict scrutiny, therefore, is through the intimate connection between
voter registration and voting itself. Depending on the actual content of
the state regulation, this connection may be more or less attenuated, and
this is what has occupied courts trying to understand how voter
registration fits into First Amendment jurisprudence.196 The Anderson
test, which is commonly regarded as the standard test for state laws
regulating elections, consists entirely of determining the extent and
result of this attenuation.197
However, voter registration is not merely conduct intertwined
with voting. It is also itself a political act. Pursuing increased voter
registration conveys, at the very least, an urgent political message about
the importance of civic engagement.198 Under this rubric, the state law’s
burden is placed not only on the right to vote, but also on the explicit
rights of free speech and association themselves. 199 As foundational as
the right to vote is, the Court is even more protective of the freedom to
convey political messages.200
The Supreme Court has not circumscribed First Amendment
protection around only literal vocalization of political messages. In
Texas v. Johnson,201 the Court articulated a standard for determining
when conduct might be considered expressive, and therefore merit
constitutional protection. When conduct evinces an intent to convey a
particularized message, coupled with a likelihood that the message will
be understood by those viewing it, that conduct is considered to be
protected under the First Amendment.202 Despite case law indicating
receptivity to the position that advocating greater voter turnout is a
political message203 and the fairly obvious extent to which registering
voters is conduct expressing that message—this point has only begun to
see the light of day in federal court.204
More recently, and in this Note’s view more perceptively, courts
have contemplated whether the act of seeking out, encouraging, and
registering third parties to vote might be more properly characterized as
195
196
197
198

McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir.1996).
See supra Part I.B..
460 U.S. 780 (1983).
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 195 (1999) (“But there are also
individuals for whom . . . the choice not to register implicates political thought and expression.”).
199 See Andrade I, 888 F. Supp. 2d 816, 841–42 (S.D. Tex 2012).
200 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410–14 (1989).
201 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
202 Id. at 404.
203 See supra note 19
204 For examples of cases that do not present this argument, see Andrade I, 888 F. Supp. 2d
816 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see also Herrera I, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D.N.M. 2008); LWV I, 447 F.
Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla 2006); Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
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political speech and associative conduct. Despite much opining about
the foundational nature of the right to vote,205 burdens on that right are
often accorded only intermediate scrutiny that itself functions
essentially as rational basis.206 Characterizing voter registration drives
as speech and association, however, places these activities in the most
protected constitutional realm.207 The uneasy and uneven application of
ballot access cases like Anderson and Burdick—factually very distinct,
and yet seeming to constitute much of the Supreme Court’s election law
jurisprudence—would no longer be required.
There are further compelling reasons to distinguish the Anderson
test as inapposite to voter registration cases. Professor Chemerinsky
notes that, while Anderson appears to make itself mandatory in the state
election law context, prior Supreme Court holdings applying strict
scrutiny to state election laws have been neither overruled nor
criticized.208 Indeed, his analysis reveals a meaningful distinction
between the two lines. The cases applying strict scrutiny do so when the
statute threatens to entirely disenfranchise an eligible citizen.209 In
contrast, the Anderson line concerns statutes that do not interfere with
the right to vote, but instead merely restrict the number of candidates
from which a voter may choose.210 This is the “burden” to which those
opinions referred. The effects of implementing heavy restrictions on
3PVROs more closely resemble wholesale disenfranchisement, insofar
as they diminish the capacity of eligible members of the electorate to
voice any preference at all.
A. Meyer and Schaumburg Permit Strict Scrutiny of State Laws That
Burden 3PVRO’s Right to Promote Voter Registration
Two notable Supreme Court cases offer the possibility of stricter
levels of scrutiny in the election context. In Meyer v. Grant, the Court

205 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.”).
206 See LWV II, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Herrera II, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183
(D.N.M. 2010); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009).
207 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988).
208 Brief of Erwin Chemerinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Crawford v.
Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2007 WL 3407037, at *12.
209 Id. (“The line of cases that includes Dunn is concerned with the complete denial of the
right to vote . . . On the other hand, the ballot access line of cases such as Burdick and Anderson
is concerned with only an indirect effect upon the right to vote that derives from a narrowing of
the field of candidates for which a vote can be cast . . . ”).
210 Id.
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invalidated a Colorado statute prohibiting compensation of petition
circulators.211 Naturally, this reduced the pool of potential circulators
willing or able to participate in the petitioning effort. Since the
prohibition limited the “number of voices” conveying this political
message, and reduced the total “quantum of speech” on a public issue,
the law was subject to exacting scrutiny. 212 “The circulation of a
petition,” the Court reasoned, “involves the type of interactive
communication concerning political change that is appropriately
described as ‘core political speech.’”213 Finally, the Court found it
irrelevant that other avenues of conveying this message remained open,
holding that the First Amendment protected not only the political
message, but their right “to select what they believe the most effective
means” of conveying that message.214
Meyer struck down a law that inevitably, but not explicitly,
reduced the number of petition workers, on the grounds that it restricted
their political expression.215 Leaving them alternate modes of promoting
their views (outside the petition circulation process, in other words) did
not make the burden more acceptable to the Court.216 Voter registration
much more closely resembles what the Court upheld in Meyer as core
First Amendment activity than it does a candidate’s access to the ballot
(as in Anderson).217 Petition circulation involves volunteer or paid
individuals interacting with the public on a personal basis, exchanging
political views, and advocating for political causes. Voter registration
drives consist of the same kind of workers, mingling with the general
public, and promulgating the political message that voting is important.
One court found the political nature of this message “obvious.”218
Given the voter registration statistics cited earlier, there is every
reason to believe that choosing to vote is now itself a political position,
as a 2008 report by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission
implied.219 This is almost certainly why a recent Federal district
211
212
213
214
215
216

486 U.S. 414 (1988).
Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 424. This is another point the Steen court ignores; in the body of its opinion, the court
constructs a hypothetical alternative to the means which the plaintiffs have selected, and then
wonders aloud why this would not be sufficient. Voting for Am., Inc. v Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 389–
90 (5th Cir. 2013).
217 Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 861 (6th Cir. 2006).
218 Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (“The interactive
nature of voter registration drives is obvious: they convey the message that participation in the
political process through voting is important to a democratic society.”).
219 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey: A Summary of Key Findings, U.S.
ELECTION
ASSISTANCE
COMMISSION
8
(November
2009),
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2008%20Election%20Administration%20and%20Votin
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decision interpreting 3PVRO restrictions found that such organizations
“seek political change at the most elemental level . . . few messages
strike closer to the underlying rationale for First Amendment
protection.”220 Even a Fifth Circuit case upholding a 3PVRO restriction
and rejecting the application of strict scrutiny accepted that “the primary
act of simply encouraging citizens to vote constitutes core
speech . . . .”221
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the
Court invalidated a state prohibition on door-to-door solicitation.222 The
Court held that “communication of information, dissemination and
propagation of views and ideas, and advocacy of causes” were all
activities protected by the First Amendment.223 While it distinguished
solicitation of contributions from those activities, it held that solicitation
and the expressive activity were “characteristically intertwined,” and
that without solicitation of this type, such communication would likely
cease.224 Under this analytical regime, the First Amendment protects
incidental political expression, as well as acts so fundamental to that
expression that, without them, the expression itself would be regulated
out of existence. To the extent that such expression is burdened by
regulations purporting to be indifferent or non-discriminatory, the court
may construe that burden as falling on political speech itself, and
therefore requiring strict scrutiny.
At the very least, voter registration falls under the characteristic
intertwining of political speech and the administrative task
accompanying it, as described in Schaumburg. The prospective voter is
approached by a 3PVRO worker, who, in seeking to register the voter,
must explain the value and importance of voting, as well as counter any
arguments that it lacks value. As noted in Buckley, “interactive
communication concerning political change” represents the zenith of
activity protected by the First Amendment.225
In any case, the Supreme Court does not require literal vocalization
of a political message in order to grant First Amendment protection—
conduct merely conveying that message will suffice, so long as an intent
to convey the message exists.226 Thus, the inevitable political
communication between registrant and registrar is superfluous to a
g%20Survey%20EAVS%20Report.pdf (“Even with a good estimate of the number of eligible
citizens, not all citizens choose to register to vote.”).
220 Andrade I, 888 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
221 Voting for Am., Inc. v. Andrade (Andrade II), 488 F. App’x 890, 897 (5th Cir. 2012).
222 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
223 Id. at 632.
224 Id.
225 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999).
226 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989).
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finding that voter registration is core First Amendment activity.
However, cases such as Schaumburg and Meyer preclude us from
discounting that communication’s value—nor should we. This accords
with the general requirement that core First Amendment rights be given
the broadest protection, so as to “assure unfettered interchange of
ideas,”227 and the obligation of the courts to protect against unnecessary
barriers to political speech.228 In fact, it was the interactive quality of
that activity that mandated application of strict scrutiny. 229
B. Federal Courts Applying Rational Basis or Intermediate Scrutiny
Misread the Holdings of Meyer and Schaumburg
This interpretation of voter registration encountered a turbulent
reception in Andrade I’s appeal to the Fifth Circuit.230 There, the court
differentiated between pure advocacy of the importance of voting, and
the administrative process of collecting applications. 231 The court held
that there was nothing “inherently expressive” about the latter, and
found the regulation impairing it permissible.232 This decision stands
alone in explicitly electing to apply rational basis review, and flies
directly in the face of Supreme Court doctrine mandating otherwise.233
The decision also ignores Supreme Court precedent pertaining to the
intertwining of speech, association, and purely administrative tasks that
function as the site of that communication.234 That precedent supplies an
exacting standard of review for statutes that “may have the effect of
curtailing the freedom to associate,”235 even when those statutes did not
purport to regulate speech itself.236
Additionally, Andrade II failed to conduct a proper “relatedness”
inquiry between the avowed purpose of the statute and its actual
mechanism. There, the statute forbade out-of-state citizens from fully

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995).
Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192.
Id. at 215.
Andrade II, 488 F. App’x 890 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 897–98. This ignores Schaumburg’s and Meyer’s actual reasoning. If applied to the
facts in Meyer, the 5th Circuit’s perspective would have differentiated between merely speaking
to someone at their door, and asking them to actually sign the petition. Meyer did exactly the
opposite, as did Schaumburg.
232 Id. at 898–900 (applying “rational basis” scrutiny to a 3PVRO regulation).
233 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
234 See id.; see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Buckley v.
Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414
(1988)..
235 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (emphasis added).
236 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192.
227
228
229
230
231
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participating in voter registration drives.237 The “rational basis”
presented was that “without some regulation, out-of-state individuals
could descend upon Texas before the voter registration deadline, engage
in unlawful and fraudulent registration practices, and then leave the
state before action could be taken against them.”238 However, merely
envisioning a possible disastrous outcome is not the same as discerning
a rational basis. Likewise, this parade of horribles was dealt with
incisively in Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd.239 There, the Fourth
Circuit noted that a simple consent to jurisdiction would suffice to
dispel the State’s fears that voter registration fraudsters would swoop in
and out of the state too rapidly for law enforcement to respond—and
would avoid highly problematic constitutional concerns in the
process.240 Given the explicit discrimination against out-of-state 3PVRO
workers, a “reasonable, non-discriminatory” standard cannot be applied,
and the State would be required to articulate the method by which this
regulation would actually accomplish its stated purpose, and establish
that it would actually do so.241
A veritable array of Supreme Court precedent also makes clear that
states may not “unnecessarily restrict” exercises of constitutional
freedoms, especially when there are less restrictive means of
accomplishing the same purpose.242 In Meyer, the Court rejected the
very reasoning presented in Andrade II, for the simple reason that even
a non-discriminatory law interfering with constitutionally protected
activities must establish some inherent usefulness to the justifying state
interest.243 There, the state had failed to establish that paid circulators
were more likely corruptible;244 in Andrade II, the state was unable to

237 They were permitted to pass out forms and “speak,” but not to handle completed forms or
submit them. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 13.031 (West 2011).
238 Andrade II, 488 F. App’x 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2012).
239 718 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013).
240 Id. at 318. The court goes on to note that “[f]ederal courts have generally looked with favor
on requiring petition circulators to agree to submit to jurisdiction for purposes of subpoena
enforcement, and the courts have viewed such a system to be a more narrowly tailored means
than a residency requirement to achieve the same result.”
241 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426 (1988) (“The State’s interest in protecting the integrity
of the initiative process does not justify the prohibition because the State has failed to
demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appellees’ ability to communicate their message in
order to meet its concerns.”).
242 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); see also Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
523 (1960) (“Freedoms such as [association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing
grievances] are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled
by more subtle government interference.”); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973) (“If the
State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a
legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties.”).
243 Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426.
244 Id.
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establish any basis for believing out-of-state registration workers were
more likely to engage in fraudulent activities.245
Additionally, the court in Andrade II failed to understand the
effects-based prescription contained in Justice Thomas’ concurrence in
Buckley, citing to Meyer for the principle that a regulation inevitably
reduces the “quantum of speech” by “limiting the number of voices” to
convey the political message.246 Andrade II distinguishes 3PVRO
activity by claiming that the law did not prevent anyone from passing
out registration forms or speaking about the importance of voting.247
The decision in Meyer, however, was rooted in the conclusion that a law
resulting in the hindrance of petition circulators from being hired—and
therefore the organization from promoting its message effectively—was
an impermissible burden on the exercise of that organization’s rights.248
The effect of the law on those organizations, not the narrow construction
of its provisions, determined its constitutionality.249 Untethered as it is
from the long history of Supreme Court precedent governing election
regulations, the reasoning in Andrade II is not viable, and should not be
applied in any future case.
The Fifth Circuit’s unfortunate repetition of many of these same
arguments in Voting for America, Inc. v. Steen250 likewise cannot be
sustained. In Steen, the court repeated its position that the expressive
and administrative components of voter registration drives were
separable, and thus subject to differing legal standards. 251 This
reasoning relies on the “disaggregation” of the act of voter registration,
an exercise that neither Meyer, Buckley, nor Schaumburg permit.
Steen purports to distinguish its facts from the relevant Supreme
Court case law on the grounds that petition circulation inherently differs
from voter registration in the extent to which it represents an expressive
act. Steen opines that petitioners and 3PVROs share the expressive acts
of solicitation of passersby, and attempts to persuade, but that voter
registration’s constitutional protection ends the moment the potential
voter signs the application.252 At this moment, the reasoning goes, both
registrar and applicant have finished speaking, and what follows is mere
245
246
247
248

Andrade II, 488 F. App’x 890, 913 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 897 n. 12.
Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422 (“[I]t makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of
signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the
matter the focus of statewide discussion.”).
249 Id. at 424 (“That appellees remain free to employ other means to disseminate their ideas
does not take their speech through petition circulators outside the bounds of First Amendment
protection.”).
250 732 F.3d 382 (2013).
251 Id. at 388–89.
252 Id. at 390.
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administrative conduct.
This line of reasoning reads Supreme Court doctrine on expressive
conduct much more narrowly than the cases permit, and draws an
arbitrary line bisecting the very field of speech that the Court sought to
protect. Steen’s conclusion is untenable under Schaumburg, which
explicitly included the administrative task within the scope of the
protected expressive conduct, describing them as “characteristically
intertwined.”253 There, the Supreme Court declined to disaggregate the
act of circulating a petition into its expressive and administrative
aspects.254 Doing so would not be difficult, under the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning in Steen: the circulator’s persuasive speech would be
protected, but his or her capacity to actually collect and deliver a
signature could be prohibited. However, the Court in Meyer cites
Schaumburg in finding that the petition circulators in fact had a right
not only to engage in speech with citizens, but to collect their signatures
and deliver them to the state.255
Likewise, the Court in Meyer declined to disaggregate the state
scheme purporting to regulate payment of petition circulators from the
overall expressive conduct, and applied strict scrutiny. 256 Under Steen’s
reasoning, a state would be free to prohibit payment of petition
circulators so long as it did not directly regulate their ability to speak.
However, the Court found that payment of circulators was
characteristically intertwined with the expressive activity of the group
they represented, and therefore that outlawing their payment constituted
a burden on their protected expression.257
Even the court in Steen notes that Meyer “did not isolate and limit
the scope of its definition of core political speech to the verbal exchange
between the petition circulator and the person whose signature was
being solicited. Instead, it considered the solicitation activity in the
aggregate as core speech.”258 The Steen court’s application of this
Supreme Court doctrine, however, would militate results in direct
opposition to those in Schaumburg and Meyer. Thus, it is fatally
253 Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)
(“Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but the latter must
be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular
views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow
of such information and advocacy would likely cease.”).
254 Id.
255 Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22 (“[T]he circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive
communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as ‘core political
speech’”
256 Id.
257 Meyer, 486 U.S. 414.
258 Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 402 (2013).
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inconsistent with binding Supreme Court law.
CONCLUSION
While the Anderson line appears to predominate, there are reasons,
both legal and practical, to believe it should not continue to do so. For
one, there is a valid and venerable line of Supreme Court doctrine
professing special respect for the right to vote, beyond what the chaotic
results at the district level have demonstrated. These results have
themselves, in their variety, betrayed the fundamental unmanageability
of the Anderson standard. In so doing, they reveal the degree to which
that standard does not “fit” the facts argued. Meyer and Schaumburg
apply much more readily to the registration of voters, and likewise
provide a standard for reviewing regulations in that area that mirrors the
reverence for voting that the Court and Congress prescribe.
Further, as public agencies have lagged behind in fulfilling the
federal mandate to register voters—and as election administration has
become more dispositive to the results of elections—3PVROs have
become ever more essential.259 In the future, courts weighing a state’s
interests in regulating elections should be forced to meaningfully
consider the likelihood of wiping double-digit percentages of the voting
population off the electoral map, as against the danger of entirely
speculative and unproven frauds.260
Lastly, this struggle to register voters must compel a slight
renaissance in construing the political nature of voter registration. When
the number of unregistered voters roughly equates to the votes received
by either party in a presidential election,261 it is clear to what extent
promotion of voter registration constitutes a political message. That
message is the same as the Constitution’s, the same as the Court’s:
voting is “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights.”262 When the number of people prevented from voting in an
election exceeds the popular-vote margin of that election,263 it is clear
exactly how much is at stake in ensuring that these laws receive the
proper scrutiny.

259
260

See supra notes 169–170; see also Weiser & Norden, supra note 3, at 20.
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